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Previous Work
Defense Acquisition Implications of Transactions 
Cost Economics (TCE)
• 2005: Franck & Melese, 
– “A TCE View of DoD Competitive Sourcing”
• 2006: Dillard + 2, 
– “A TCE Approach to Defense Acquisition Management”
• 2007: Angelis + 3, 
– “Applying Transaction Cost Economics to Improve DoD Cost 
Estimates”
• 2008: Angelis + 5/3, 
– “Exploring the Implications of TCE on Joint and System-of-
Systems Programs”




• THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS (Melese)
• THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCE 
SURVEY OF AIR FORCE PROGRAM 
MANAGERS (Dillard)





Performance, Cost and Schedule
• Weapons acquisition is afflicted by similar 
pathologies that impact public sector 
procurement: 
– Conflicting goals & objectives
– Information asymmetry,
– Lack of credible commitments
• In addition to
– Technical complexity, 
– Asset specificity, and
– Uncertainty (funding; demand; design; production)
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Background
• 2008, National Academy of Sciences study for 
Optimizing U.S. Air Force and Department of 
Defense Review of Air Force Acquisition 
Programs
• Myriad of programmatic and technical reviews 
prescribed for space and non-space system 
acquisition programs
• Options to streamline, consolidate, reduce?
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Contribution of Our Study
• Examine roles of monitoring & oversight 
– Programmatic and technical reviews
• Within the context of two frameworks:
– Principal-Agent Model (Agency Theory)
– Transaction Cost Economics (TCE)
• Begin to describe benefits & costs of current 
monitoring & oversight
















• Model Assumptions—Principal and Agents have:
– Conflicting Goals & Objectives of different players 
• (Congress, OSD, PEO, PM, Contractor, etc.)
– Asymmetric Information
• Agent has information advantage over Principal
– Adverse Selection: Only Agent knows his type (abilities, costs)
– Moral Hazard: Only Agent knows his effort (quality, savings,…)
– Imperfect Information
• Uncertain correlation between Effort and Outcomes
• Agents are risk averse
• Goal: 
– Evaluate alternative governance mechanisms that align 
interests of Agents with Principal
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Aligning Interests of Agents with Principal 
• Monitoring & Oversight (Reagan: “Trust but Verify”)
– Ex-ante controls
• Legal & Administrative Procedures
• Reporting Requirements
– Restricts Agents’ flexibility (administrators vs. managers)
– Ex-post oversight
• Budgetary Restrictions (color of money)
• Monitoring (What? & How?) or Surveillance of Agent 
– “Police patrol”: Continued & detailed oversight & direct 
supervision
– “Fire alarm”: Rely on third parties (GAO;etc.) for oversight
– Regulatory oversight cost premium reduces competition
– Can properly structured incentives & other governance mechanisms
substitute for some monitoring & oversight?
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Transaction Costs: Monitoring & 
Oversight
• According to Heritage Foundation study
• For six months in the early 1990s, Ambassador Henry F. 
Cooper (then director of the Strategiv Defense Initiative 
Organization), tracked the costs to support one decision 
point in THAAD (Theater High Altitude Area Defense). It 
took:
– 75,000 government labor hours
– 250,000 contractor labor hours
– Over 1 ton of documents
– $22 million
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A Transactions Cost Guide
In making outsourcing decisions, it is important to 
consider not only the internal and external production 
costs of providing the good or service, but also the 
cost of managing the transaction internally or 
externally.
Total Costs = Production Costs + Transaction Costs
Transaction Costs = Search and Information Costs + Bargaining, 
Decision and Contracting Costs + Policing and Enforcement Costs
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Transaction Cost Economics (TCE)
• Objective: Design governance mechanisms that 
minimize coordination costs, and the costs of 
motivating effort and investments to achieve “better, 
faster, cheaper.”
• Main insight of TCE is that understanding key 
characteristics of a transaction can help guide the 
optimal choice of governance mechanisms
– Anticipate re-negotiation costs (hold-up, change orders, lock-in, etc.)
– If ex-post opportunistic transaction costs are ignored, then future cost 
increases may not be properly anticipated.
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Spectrum of Market Structures












• Multi-Year Contracting and Frequency
• Integrated Product and Process Development and Asset 
Ownership
• Cost as an Independent Variable (CAIV) – Heightened 
Awareness/Shared Risk
• Alpha Contracting for ex-ante Discovery
• Evolutionary Acquisition Addresses Uncertainty Incrementally
• Single Process Initiative Uses Frequency and Specialization
• Reputation and the Use of Past Performance Data and Award for 
Best Value
• Education, training and expansion of Acquisition workforce
• Increased Monitoring & Oversight (PROGRAM REVIEWS)
Current Acquisition Practices 
Address Some Principal-Agent & TCE Concerns
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Programmatic Reviews
• Multiple, various title, new and long-established, reviews for 
management oversight by program executive officer (PEO), Service-
level acquisition executive, Office of the Secretary of Defense Staff, 
and Milestone Decision Authority/Defense acquisition executive
• Often scheduled and conducted according to pre-arranged milestone 
dates or per an “acquisition baseline” established by PM and multi-
level staffs well in advance, or can be on call/ad hoc as program issues 
arise
• To inform key staff members in the Pentagon (and Congress) about
business and technical progress of programs
• Often result in guidance to alter the course of programs through re-
structuring, re-scheduling, subtracting funds, changing quantities, etc.
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Technical Reviews
• Approximately 9 to 11 standard title, well-established, and broadly 
recognized reviews within the Systems Engineering Process -- More 
technical than business oriented
• Conducted at the local (program office) level, chaired by the PM, 
monitoring the technical progress of the system prime contractor and 
subcontractors 
• Scheduled and conducted at the PM's discretion when appropriate 
(event or progress-based vs. calendar-based).
• Provide information to key project members/stakeholders for future 
actions. Facilitate issue discovery and usually do not change the 
principal course of a program
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NAS Study – PM Survey
• Main question: Can changes in the number, content, 
or sequence of program reviews help the program 
manager more successfully execute the program?
• Subjective answers from US Air Force PMs and PEOs 
about reviews and their impact on program execution, 
such as time or effort dedicated to review preparation, 
participation, and response to actions produced from 
them 
18
Context of the NAS Study
• 2000 - 2008, four iterations of the DOD 5000 series 
governing acquisition programs
• Number and levels of reviews steadily increasing
– Technical (Internal to PMO with Contractor)
– Programmatic (Government levels of oversight)
• For prevention of requirements “creep,” assurance of 
adequate cost estimation, and attainment of technical 
maturity in regard to design and producibility 
• Questions on their cost, impact, value…
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The Nature of Increasing Reviews
• Occur at Program Executive Office, Service, and Office 
of Secretary of Defense levels
• New 5000 = New programmatic reviews
- PSRs, CSBs, OTRAs
- Extensive preparatory activities for each





– Can we use PM survey to quantify oversight and 
monitoring costs?
• Principal-Agent 
– Is there a difference in the perceived cost/benefit 
of oversight and monitoring activities when then 
PM acts as the:
• Principal (technical reviews)?
• Agent (programmatic reviews)?
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Starting Assumptions
• Subjective perceptions of relative cost/benefit of 
reviews provide useful insights into transaction 
costs
• Starting Assumption - PMs are more likely to:
– View technical reviews as less costly/more beneficial




• The only data available from the survey 
report was in summary form 
– The total response count for each question is 
available but not the individual responses
• Analysis limited to section 2 
(Program Activity Overview)
– Provided information on pertinent external 




Technology Readiness Assessment 
(TRA)
Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) 
Milestone Review
Technology Maturity Assessment 
(TMA)
Defense Space Acquisition Board 
(DSAB) Milestone Review
Manufacturing Readiness Review 
(MRR)
Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) Status 
Review
System Engineering Assessment Model 
(SEAM)
Defense Space Acquisition Board 
(DSAB) Status Review
Overarching Integrated Product Team 
(OIPT) Review
Independent Program Assessment (IPA) 
*Program Support Review (PSR)
Logistics Health Assessment (LHA)
Air Force Review Board (AFRB)
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Some Hypotheses Tested (to date)
1. The perceived value (impact) of technical reviews is 
higher than the value of program reviews.  
2. Technical reviews are more likely to be rated as helpful 
(provide useful data) than program reviews.  
3. Technical reviews are less likely to be perceived as 
less beneficial than program reviews.  
4. Technical reviews are more likely to be perceived as 
well structured (less likely to be combined with other 
reviews) than program reviews.  
5. The perceived cost (level of documentation required) of 
program reviews is significantly higher than the cost of 
technical reviews.  
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Hypothesis 1 – Results 
(Intuition-Neutral) 
• Technical reviews are significantly more 
likely to be seen as having no impact on 
program performance and are somewhat 
less likely to be seen as having a negative 
impact on program performance.
– Technical reviews are necessary to keep 
program on track but have little impact on overall 
performance.
– Programmatic reviews may result in unforeseen 
complications (PM’s perspective).
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Hypothesis 2 – Results 
(Counterintuitive)
• Programmatic reviews are significantly more 
likely to be seen as  providing some or lots 
of useful data while technical reviews are 
significantly more likely to be seen as 
providing little or no useful data.
– A programmatic review may be an opportunity to 
make the PM’s case to senior leadership.
– Technical issues may cover ground already 
familiar to the PM.
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Hypothesis 3 – Results 
(Counterintuitive)
• Technical reviews are more likely to be rated 
as least or second least beneficial
– Programmatic reviews are better opportunities to 
communicate with higher authorities (consistent 
with hypothesis 2 results).
– Less new information (for PMs) surfaces in 
technical reviews, hence lower impact and less 
potential benefit to program.
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Hypothesis 4 – Results 
(Counterintuitive)
• Technical reviews are more likely to be 
identified as candidates for consolidation
– Puzzling.  PMs presumably have more control 
over structuring technical reviews than 
programmatic.
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Hypothesis 5 – Results (Intuitive) 
• Technical reviews are more likely to be seen 
as not having enough documentation.  
– Summarized information provided to higher level 
authorities is not adequate to understand 
technical issues.
– Program managers understand the technical 
details and are aware of more information that 
could be used to document  them.
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Some Preliminary Conclusions
• PMs find value in programmatic reviews even if 
they are more costly
– Essential to program success
– Pleased that necessary decisions have been made
• Relieved that its over?
• Perceived value of technical reviews could be 
lower because
– Delivered by contractor as required
• Not necessarily if/when needed
– PM more in tune with technical issues
• Review just a formality
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Continuing Our Research
• Working on getting more access to survey 
results.
• Much better analysis possible with more raw 
data
– To understand cost/benefit for specific reviews
– May provide insight into effectiveness of 
incentives and principal-agent relationship
32
33
Alternative Options to Align Interests 
of Agents with Principal 
• When Measurement & Monitoring is Costly
– Invest in more efficient oversight (people & processes)
– Invest in more complete contract (measurement, etc.)
– Cost Plus vs. Fixed Price vs. Incentive contracts (NSPS)
– Gain-sharing
– “Efficiency wages” (pay a premium above market price)
– Tournament (promotions, relative performance,etc.)
– Deferred compensation (pay after experience is obtained)
– Tenure (negotiate promise of follow-on contracts)
– Dispute resolution mechanisms (warranties, etc.)
– Invest in (build) identity, integrity, trust & communication
– Invest in Transparency & Accountability & Learning
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Minimizing Transaction Costs
• Cut Coordination and Motivation Costs
– Reduce complexity
• Invest in more complete contract (search & information costs)
• Use of Mature technology
– Reduce uncertainty
• Invest in more complete contract (bargaining & decision costs)
• Measurement, Monitoring to reduce information asymmetries
• Credible deterrents (enforcement, penalty clauses, etc.)
• Warranties/Bonding
– Increase frequency
• Multi-year contracts 
• Reputation
– Address asset specificity
• Reduce government requirements for specific investments
• Align Incentives
• Government Owned Contractor Operated (GOCO) Specific Assets
– Increase contestability
• Government Standby Capacity/Expertise 
• Threat of vertical integration (bring it back in-house)
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KP2 KP3KP1
Notional Programmatic and Technical Reviews
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Contract Design
(Milgrom & Roberts 1992)
• Informativeness Principle
– Contract should include any measure that reveals level of agent’s effort
• Incentive Intensity Principle
– Optimal intensity of incentives depends on
• Opportunity for incremental savings
• Ability to measure effort & outcomes
• Agent’s tolerance for (willingness to accept) risks
• Agent’s responsiveness to incentives
• Monitoring Intensity Principle
• Where optimal incentive intensity is high, optimal monitoring is high
• Equal Compensation Principle
– Risk of Multi-tasking (“what gets measured gets done”)
• Target measures to align Agents equally to all tasks valued by the Principal
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Transaction Costs
• TC costs include coordination and motivation costs, such as 
search and information costs; decision, contracting and 
incentive costs; and measurement, monitoring and 
enforcement costs 
• Each review is discrete, with a substantial workload impact 
and cost
• For oversight (programmatic) reviews, possible diversion from 
day-to-day core program management activities








– Time Criticality (war/peace)







– Search & Information Costs
• Planning: Identify Alternatives
• Costs to acquire timely, accurate & relevant information (AoA)
– Bargaining & Decision Costs 
• Programming: Choose an Alternative
• Costs of negotiating and writing contracts
– Policing & Enforcement Costs 
• Budgeting & Execution
• Costs of executing, monitoring, measuring, and evaluating contracts
• Motivation Costs
– Costs of Countering Opportunistic Behavior
• Costs of encouraging investments in “specific assets”
– Specific Asset investments that lead to “Hold-Up”
– Competitive bidding that leads to bi-lateral Monopoly
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Key Characteristics of Defense Acquisition 
Transactions:
1. Complexity 
– Can we specify all possible contingencies in the contract?
• Credence or Experience goods (R&D)
2. Uncertainty
– Imperfect Information: probability distributions?
• Demand/Quantity, Cost, Schedule, Performance/Quality
– Asymmetric information: Does someone have information advantage?
3. Frequency
– One-shot or repeated transaction? Does reputation matter?
4. Time Criticality
– Wartime or peacetime? How sensitive to price in emergencies?
5. Asset Specificity
– Can we encourage specific investments and preserve competition?
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Transaction-Specific Asset Investments
• Specific assets are specific to the transaction & 
lose much of their value in an alternative use. 
• Specific Assets come in a variety of flavors:
• Physical Assets (specialized equipment)
• Human Assets (special skills,  knowledge, training)
• Site Specificity (special locations that economize on 
inventory (EOQ), transport costs)
• Temporal Specificity (investment in bottleneck 
activities—PERT/CPM—that impact overall project 
completion costs and schedules)
42
Characteristics favoring EXTERNAL market 
transactions: 
Asset Specificity:
If there are few specific investments in human or physical 
capital required and these investments retain much of 
their value outside the transaction.
Frequency:
If the transaction does not require close working 
relationships between the parties involved, and take place 
routinely (economies of scale, learning curves).
Uncertainty/Complexity:
If the transaction is standard, well understood so that 
detailed agreements are unnecessary.
Performance Measurement:
If the market regulates quality and performance.
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How to protect (encourage) valuable  
transaction-specific investments?
• If individuals or companies cannot be assured of 
realizing the full value of their specific 
investments, then they will not invest in specific 
assets to achieve “better, faster, cheaper.”
• Transactions that require specific investments 
normally also require credible protection against 
early termination or opportunistic re-negotiation.
– Multi-year contracts (long-term contractual relationship)
– Posting a bond (enforceable termination commitments)
– Reputation
